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STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, ROCKLAND 
COUNTY LOCAL 844, ROCKLAND COUNTY UNIT, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-14788 
COUNTY OF ROCKLAND, 
.Respondent. 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (MIGUEL ORTIZ of counsel), 
for Charging Party 
PAUL NOWICKI, COUNTY ATTORNEY (JACK SCHLOSS Of counsel), for 
Respondent 
) . 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the County of 
Rockland (County) to a decision by an Administrative Law Judge 
(ALT) finding that the County violated §209-a.l(d) of the Public 
Employees7 Fair Employment Act (Act) by failing to negotiate in 
good faith with the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., 
Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, Rockland County Local 844, Rockland 
County Unit (CSEA). CSEA alleges in its charge that the County 
negotiated in bad faith by misrepresenting its financial 
condition to it and to the fact finder. CSEA further alleges 
that based upon the County's representations, it subsequently 
agreed to a 1993-95 contract, acceding to the County's demand 
) that there be no salary increases for unit employees for 1992. 
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After a hearing, at which the County rested without calling any 
witnesses, the ALJ found that the County had deliberately 
misrepresented its financial condition at fact-finding and to 
CSEA in negotiations following fact-finding, and ordered the 
County to reopen negotiations, at CSEA's request, for 1992 
salaries for unit employees. 
The County excepts to the AKT's decision, arguing that there 
is no record evidence that the County deliberately misrepresented 
its financial status or withheld requested financial information 
from CSEA or that CSEA relied to its detriment on any financial 
information which it received from the County. In fact, the 
County asserts, CSEA had agreed that the County had fulfilled all 
of its bargaining obligations under the Act for 1992. CSEA 
supports the ALJ's decision. 
After a review of the record and a consideration of the 
parties' arguments, we affirm the decision of the ALJ in part and 
reverse in part. 
Only CSEA called any witnesses or introduced any evidence at 
the hearing, which the ALJ relied upon in finding the following 
facts. The County and CSEA were parties to an agreement which 
expired on December 31, 1991. The parties commenced negotiations 
in 1991 and were engaged in negotiations and mediation through 
1992. CSEA sought a three=year agreement, with salary increases 
in each year. The County originally proposed a one-year 
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agreement with no salary increase,^ but modified its position 
in early 1992, calling for a three-year agreement, with a salary 
freeze in 1992, and raises of three and four percent in 1993 
and 1994, respectively. A fact-finding hearing was held on 
January 20, 1993. Through its Deputy Budget Director, Clint 
Toms, the County introduced a document at the fact-finding 
hearing showing that the County estimated a negative fund balance 
in the general fund for 1992.-' CSEA's witnesses disputed the 
evidence concerning the County's financial circumstances and 
testified at the fact-finding hearing that the County had 
"overestimated expenditure accounts and underestimated sales tax 
revenue". The fact finder's report, which issued on February 4, 
1993, noted that the County had projected a two to three million 
dollar deficit for 1992. Based on the evidence the County 
submitted, the fact finder recommended no salary increase for 
1992, a three percent increase for 1993 and a four percent 
increase for 1994, as proposed by the County. CSEA rejected the 
i7The County asserted throughout negotiations that it was facing 
a deficit for 1992 in its general fund, the fund which is the 
County's primary operating fund and which includes all of the 
County's revenues and expenditures not required by law to be 
accounted for in other funds. The County took the position that 
it was, therefore, unable to fund any salary increases for 1992. 
-
7The County also offered evidence regarding the large number of 
layoffs which had occurred in 1991, a decline in the County's 
credit worthiness rating, and problems with federal aid, tax 
rates and collection of taxes. Although the County's 1992 fiscal 
year ended on December 31, 1992, final closure of its books was 
not required until March 31, 1993. 
Board - U-14788 -4 
fact-finding report.s/ The parties thereafter resumed 
negotiations, with the County continuing to maintain that it 
could not fund a salary increase for 1992.-' On April 30, 1993', 
the County and CSEA concluded a contract for 1993-95, with a 
three percent increase for 1993, four percent for 1994 and five 
percent for 1995. Annexed to that contract is a letter of 
understanding addressing 1992, which states: 
The CSEA agrees that for calendar year 1992, 
the County has complied with all of its Taylor Law 
obligations and the Union agrees that as of the 
effective date of this agreement the CSEA has 
accepted the same terms and conditions of employment 
(including salary) for calendar year 1992 as existed on 
December 31, 1991. 
The proposed agreement was thereafter ratified by the CSEA 
membership. 
Larry Sparber, the CSEA collective bargaining specialist who 
had participated in the negotiations, testified that in seeking 
ratification of the agreement, the negotiating team explained to 
the membership that the contract 
was based upon the fact finder. We had succeeded in 
getting an additional year on the contract, extending 
it one more year. There were other parts to the new 
agreement affecting health insurance, which were of 
primary interest to the overall membership, and we felt 
-'Caroline Osinga, CSEA unit president, testified that the unit 
members 
didn't believe it. They felt that it was being hidden, 
that the County did not — that the County in fact had 
the money and we were not being given our due that they 
felt we should have gotten. 
-'There is no record evidence that the County continued to 
reiterate in these negotiations that there would be a deficit for 
1992 or what the amount of the deficit would be. 
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we succeeded in getting the best deal we could in 
regards to the health insurance. 
So as a total package even though the group was — 
from CSEA's standpoint was very dissatisfied with the 
1992 negative increase, the overall package was 
something we felt that we could at least bring back to 
the membership and see how they would feel about that. 
From June through August 1993, Harold Peterson, the County 
Commissioner of Finance, and John Grant, the County Executive, 
were quoted in local newspapers as saying that the County budget 
had an $8.4 million surplus in the general fund for 1992.-' 
Osinga testified that she heard both men make similar statements 
in radio interviews. 
County Legislator Bruce Levine also testified that, pursuant 
to his inquiries about the County's budget status in October and 
November 1992, he was told by Peterson and Toms that there was 
approximately $2 million in surplus from 1991, that the County 
would either have the $2 million "left", or that the County might 
be short and have to use that surplus for 1992. In either event, 
no deficit was indicated to the legislature. Moreover, in the 
-''A June 16, 1993 newspaper article quotes Peterson as saying: 
The [C]ounty of Rockland did not negotiate in bad 
faith. The contract of no increase this year ... is a 
fair contract, and a reasonable one. If the CSEA had 
bothered looking into it in November, they could have 
found out that we had this surplus. We did nothing -
everything was public record. 
Grant wrote a letter to the Rockland Journal-News, appearing in 
the August 8, 1993 edition, confirming the surplus and explaining 
that the County had 
saved $2.1 million through strict enforcement of 
budgetary controls and management discipline, $4.4 
million by refinancing the County's debt, and we 
retained $1.9 million from the previous year's reserve. 
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spring of 1993, Peterson or Toms told Levine that they had known 
in late December 1992 or early January 1993 (before the fact-
finding hearing) that there was going to be a "big chunk of money 
coming in" and a "significant" surplus in the 1992 County budget, 
as a result, in part, of a refinancing of the County's retirement 
fund obligation and the sale of bonds to pay for this obligation. 
The ALJ found that the County had deliberately 
misrepresented its finances at fact-finding and in subsequent 
negotiations with CSEA, that the fact finder relied, at least in 
part, upon the County's misrepresentations in making his report 
and recommendation, and that CSEA relied upon the County's 
misrepresentations in agreeing that the County had fulfilled its 
J obligations under the Act for 1992. 
The County argues that there is no record evidence that the 
County or its agents lied about its financial condition either at 
fact-finding or during the negotiations that followed. However, 
based upon the unrebutted testimony at the hearing and the 
documentary evidence, the ALJ found that County agents knew at 
least by late December 1992 or early January 1993 that there 
would be a surplus. Yet, at the fact-finding hearing, the County 
submitted a document to the fact finder which stated that for 
1992 the unrestricted fund balance was "Est. Negative", and, 
according to the fact finder's report, Toms presented evidence 
at the fact-finding hearing that the County was facing a two to 
three million dollar deficit for 1992. 
\ 
_/ 
It is a basic tenet of labor relations that "good-faith 
bargaining necessarily requires that claims made by either 
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bargainer should be honest claims. This is true about an 
asserted inability to pay an increase in wages11.-7 To the same 
effect, we have previously held: 
[t]o deliberately mislead a party in response to its 
specific inquiry is no more consistent with the concept 
of good faith bargaining than would be the fabrication 
and distribution of false information.-7 
A party to a bargaining relationship violates its duty to 
negotiate in good faith when it knowingly and intentionally 
misrepresents material facts in its possession during 
negotiations. We have previously found that the duty to 
negotiate in good faith extends through mediation and fact-
finding and during the parties7 subsequent negotiations.-7 We 
find that the County deliberately misrepresented to CSEA and the 
fact finder at fact-finding that it would and did have a negative 
fund balance for 1992, when, according to unrebutted testimony, 
it knew prior to the fact-finding hearing that there was a 
significant surplus for that year. The misrepresentation to the 
fact finder is particularly disturbing because the Act's impasse 
procedures cannot work as intended if the neutral who is 
attempting to aid the parties in reaching an agreement is given 
false factual information. That the County provided to CSEA 
specific documentation which CSEA requested during the course of 
-
7NLRB V, Truitt Mfg, Co,, 351 U.S. 149, 38 LRRM 2042, 2043 
(1956). 
-
7State of New York (Governor's Office of Employee Relations), 
25 PERB 53078, at 3159 (1992), aff'd, 197 A.D.2d 341, 27 PERB 
57006 (3d Dep't 1994). 
g7Poucrhkeepsie Public School Teachers Ass'n, 27 PERB 53079 
(1994); City of Mount Vernon, 11 PERB f3095 (1978). 
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negotiations does not negate the misrepresentation, even if those 
documents were wholly accurate. The violation found in this case 
is premised upon the misrepresentation of fact, not any failure 
or refusal to provide information upon demand. We emphasize that 
what is not in issue here are expressions of opinion or 
bargaining positions taken during negotiations. Our decision 
addresses only an affirmative misrepresentation of material fact, 
i.e., the specifically asserted existence of a budget deficit in 
the face of a known surplus. Therefore, the County violated 
§209-a.l(d) of the Act when it deliberately misrepresented its 
budget balance for 1992 to the fact finder and to CSEA at fact-
finding. The letter of understanding attached to the 1993-95 
collective bargaining agreement in no way absolves the County of 
its wrongful conduct because that letter of understanding 
derived, at least in part, from the very misrepresentations which 
violated the County's obligations under the Act. 
We do not find, however, that the record supports the AKT's 
finding that the County specifically continued its 
misrepresentations of a budget deficit in its negotiations with 
CSEA after fact-finding. Therefore, that part of the AKT's 
decision finding that the County violated the Act by 
misrepresenting its budget deficit in negotiations after fact-
finding is reversed. 
Given our finding that the record does not show that the 
County continued to misrepresent its financial condition during 
the negotiations with CSEA subseguent to fact-finding, we also 
modify the AKT's remedy to the extent that it orders the County 
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to reopen negotiations upon CSEA's demand for salaries for unit 
employees for 1992. 
The AKT's order of a salary reopener for 1992 effectively 
rescinds the parties' agreement for that year. Rescission is an 
extraordinary remedy, which may be warranted in cases involving a 
knowingly fraudulent misrepresentation of material fact, where 
there is both an intent to deceive a party and detrimental 
reliance upon the misrepresentation, which results in an 
inducement to agree or to execute an agreement.-'' The County's 
misrepresentation of its financial condition to the fact finder 
and CSEA at fact-finding constitutes a serious breach of its duty 
to negotiate in good faith. We strongly rebuke the County for 
making it. However, we cannot find, upon the facts presented 
here, detrimental reliance inducing agreement on the 
misrepresentation alone. CSEA did rely, in part, upon the 
County's misrepresentations at fact-finding and the fact finder's 
conclusions based upon those misrepresentations when it agreed to 
no salary increase for unit employees for 1992, but CSEA also 
continued to express its doubts about the County's financial 
condition throughout the subsequent negotiations, as it had at 
fact—finding. Therefore, the reopener of the 1992 agreement, as 
ordered by the ALT, is not warranted. 
In any event, the agreement finally negotiated was for an 
additional year (1995) and included salary increases for each of 
27
 See Rozay's Transfer v. Teamsters Local 208, 128 LRRM 2955 
(9th Cir. 1988). See also Steelworkers v. Johnston Industries, 
120 LRRM 2695 (E.D. Mich. 1984). 
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several years, as well as enhanced health benefits. We cannot 
determine whether CSEA accepted no salary increase for 1992 
because an additional year was added to the agreement with an 
accompanying salary increase, because of the improved health 
insurance provisions, because of the County's misrepresentations 
at fact-finding, because of some combination of the above, or 
because of other reasons. The 1992 agreement simply cannot be 
severed from the remainder of the parties7 contract. Therefore, 
if we were to order a reopening of any portion of the parties7 
agreement, it would be necessary to rescind it in its entirety, 
not only for one year. We do not consider such a remedy to be 
appropriate, there being no impropriety alleged or found in 
conjunction with the 1993-95 agreement. 
Based on the foregoing, we deny the County's exceptions and 
affirm the ALJ7s decision except as reversed to the extent noted 
above. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the County: 
1. Cease and desist from misrepresenting its budget 
balance at fact-finding. 
2. Sign and post the notice in the form attached in all 
locations at which notices of information to CSEA unit 
employees are ordinarily posted. 
DATED: February 28, 1996 
Albany, New York 
aline R. Kirtsella,Chai] Pau sella, rperson 
Eric y. Schmertz, Member 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees in the unit represented by the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, 
AFL-CIO, Rockland County Local 844, Rockland County Unit (CSEA) that the County of Rockland: 
1. Will not misrepresent its budget balance at fact-finding. 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
COUNTY OF ROCKLAND 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered 
by any other material. 
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STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
VELTON NIX, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-15705 
TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION, LOCAL 100, 
Respondent, 
-and-
NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY, 
Employer. 
RICHARD V. RAPPAPORT, ESQ., for Charging Party 
O'DONNELL, SCHWARTZ, GLANSTEIN & ROSEN (EDWARD PENDELTON of 
counsel), for Respondent 
MARTIN B. SCHNABEL, ACTING GENERAL COUNSEL (EVELYN JONAS Of 
counsel), for Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by Velton Nix to a 
decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing his 
charge that the Transport Workers Union, Local 100 (TWU) violated 
§209-a.2(a), (b) and (c) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment 
Act (Act) in connection with its representation of him concerning 
disciplinary charges brought against him by his employer, the New 
York City Transit Authority (Authority) .-' The Authority was 
-
7The alleged violation of §209-a.2(b) was not processed as Nix 
was advised that he did not have standing to allege a violation 
of that section of the Act. 
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made a party pursuant to §209-a.3 of the Act. The ALJ found that 
there was no evidence that the TWU had violated either §2 09-
a.l(a) or (c) of the Act. 
Nix excepts to the ALJ's decision, arguing that the ALJ 
erred in finding that he had excessive absences, that the TWU had 
represented him fairly in his disciplinary arbitration, that no 
violation occurred with respect to the adjournments of the 
disciplinary arbitration sought by the TWU, and that it did not 
violate the Act when it failed to advise him that he could file a 
grievance over pay lost while he was suspended pending his 
termination. The Authority and the TWU support the ALJ's 
decision. 
Based upon our review of the record and consideration of the 
parties' arguments, we affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
The record shows that Nix was employed by the Authority as a 
station cleaner from 1984 until his termination in 1993, and was 
at all times represented by TWU. In August 1993, Nix altered the 
dates on his doctor's authorization for absence from work.-7 
When this alteration was discovered by the Authority in November 
1993, charges for submission of a fraudulent sick leave 
application were immediately brought against Nix by the 
-'Nix was on sick leave from work, pursuant to a doctor's note, 
from August 3 to August 14, 1993. He altered the doctor's note 
to show a return date of August 19, 1993. 
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Authority, resulting in his suspension. The Authority sought his 
termination.-7 
While Nix did not deny that he had submitted an altered sick 
leave application, the TWU asserted throughout the disciplinary 
proceedings that there were mitigating circumstances-7 and 
sought a lesser penalty than termination. The matter was 
submitted to a tripartite arbitration board, as provided in 
the TWU-Authority contract.-7 The initial hearing date of 
January 5, 1994, was adjourned when Nix admitted to his TWU 
representative for the first time just prior to the hearing that 
he had altered the doctor's note and that he had done so to 
attend a counselling session for his son on August 18, 1993. As 
Nix was unable at that time to offer any corroborating 
details,-7 the TWU representative obtained an adjournment to 
-
7The charges were added to charges of abuse of sick leave which 
were already pending against Nix. 
-
7Nix claimed to the TWU representative that he was having 
problems with his son, which the representative related to the 
hearing officer at steps I and II of the disciplinary process. 
-
7The Authority's witness at the hearing, Michael Lendino, 
Director of Labor Relations, testified, and the AKJ so found, 
that the TWU was able to get one of the charges against Nix 
withdrawn by the Authority, but the TWU's efforts to settle the 
remaining charges against Nix short of termination were rebuffed 
by the Authority because of his prior record. During the nine 
years he was employed by the Authority, Nix was disciplined, 
warned and suspended numerous times for lateness, failure to 
report, and poor attendance, and was also disciplined for testing 
positive for drugs and for performance-related infractions. 
-
7Nix could only relate that his son was at a treatment facility 
in the Bronx. He stated that he did not know the names of the 
facility, his son's physician or counselor. 
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allow Nix to get a written confirmation that his presence was 
necessary at his son's treatment facility and that he did, in 
fact, attend the counselling session on the date in question. A 
subsequent hearing date of February 9, 1994 was also adjourned 
because Nix had not yet obtained the requested documentation.-7 
A third date of hearing, March 30, 1994, was cancelled by TWU 
because of contract negotiations.-7 The hearing was held on 
April 27, 1994, at which time Nix testified to the circumstances 
which prompted him to alter the sick leave form. He did not 
produce a letter from his son's physician or the treatment 
facility concerning the August 18 counselling session and he 
refused to let the TWU call his son as a witness to corroborate 
his testimony.-7 By decision dated May 9, 1994, the arbitration 
board sustained the Authority's charge against Nix and his 
employment was terminated.—7 
-
7The hearing went forward on Nix's time and attendance charges 
but was adjourned by the arbitration board as to the alteration 
of the doctor's note to enable Nix to obtain documentation of his 
whereabouts on August 18, 1993. 
-
7Nix was advised that adjournments sought by the TWU would 
result in his not being paid. Nix was also advised, however, 
that because the second day of hearing was not rescheduled within 
the contractual time limits, he might arguably be entitled to 
some pay and he was instructed on how to file an affidavit with 
the Authority. 
-
7Nix did have a letter from a treatment facility stating that 
his son had been in treatment for substance abuse from August 
1992 to December 1993. 
—
7The TWU submitted to the arbitration board awards in past cases 
where employees brought up on similar charges were not 
terminated. Lendino testified that those cases involved first 
instances of misconduct by employees with what were otherwise 
good work records. 
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Nix, claiming animus towards him by the TWU, testified that 
he was a witness at an arbitration sometime prior to 1992 on 
charges he had filed against another employee represented by TWU 
alleging that Nix had been threatened by the employee, who 
brandished a knife at him. He alleged that the TWU attorney 
handling the arbitration had tried to get him to drop the charges 
and state that the other employee did not have a knife. Nix 
claims that the TWU was angered by his testimony at the 
arbitration and harbored animus toward him because of this 
incident. He offered no evidence as to the date, the other 
employee or the TWU attorney who had been involved in the alleged 
incident. 
Nix asserts in his exceptions that the TWU should have 
advised him in his prior disciplinary matters that he had a right 
to contest them so that they, arguably, could not be used against 
him in the disciplinary proceeding which led to his termination. 
This allegation was not included in Nix's charge and was not 
raised to the ALJ; it is, therefore, not properly before us and 
we do not consider it. 
Nix further alleges that the TWU's actions were taken in bad 
faith, pointing to his testimony against another unit employee at 
a prior arbitration as proof of TWU's animus. The ALJ did not 
credit Nix's testimony. Further, there is no evidence in the 
record upon which to base a finding that the TWU representatives 
assisting Nix in his disciplinary hearing were even aware of the 
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prior matter, much less that they harbored animus towards Nix 
which affected their representation of him. 
Nix also asserts that the TWU did not fairly represent him 
in the disciplinary proceeding. His allegations are basically 
that the ALT should have credited his testimony and not that of 
the TWU and Authority witnesses. The ALT specifically credited 
the testimony of the TWU's witnesses over Nix and we find nothing 
in the record which would warrant disturbing those credibility 
resolutions. The record reflects, and the ALT so found, that the 
TWU represented Nix throughout the disciplinary proceeding, 
meeting with him on several occasions to discuss his case .and 
advise him of his rights, including his right to obtain his own 
counsel and to resign instead of facing termination. As to Nix7s 
assertion that the TWU made no effort to have him placed in the 
Employee Assistance Program (EAP), the ALT properly found that 
Nix had told the TWU representatives that he was "clean" and was 
not "using" and, therefore, did not want or need EAP.—7 
Finally, Nix claims that the ALT erred in finding that the 
TWU did not breach the duty of fair representation when it failed 
to assist him in obtaining pay during the time he was suspended 
and his.disciplinary hearings were being adjourned. The record 
supports the ALT's conclusion that Nix was informed of the 
contractual procedures to follow in pursuit of his pay claim. 
His claim was denied because of timeliness and the TWU advised 
—
7Nix had previously been placed in EAP pursuant to his positive 
drug test. 
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him to refile. That the TWU did not further pursue this claim on 
his behalf does not rise to the level of arbitrary, 
discriminatory or bad faith conduct necessary to support the 
finding of a violation of the duty of fair representation.—7 
Based on the foregoing, the exceptions filed by Nix are 
denied and the decision of the ALJ is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: February 28, 1996 
Albany, New York 
P.- r ,lwL 
Pafuline R. "fcinsella, Chai rperson 
^ C i v i l Se rv i ce Employees Ass ' n v . Diaz, 132 A.D.2d 430, 20 PERB 
57024 (3d Dep ' t 1987), a f f ' d on o t h e r grounds , 73 N.Y.2d 796, 
21 PERB 57017 (1988) . 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
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In the Matter of 
MICHELLE J. YASKEL, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-16044 
STATE OP NEW YORK (DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION), 
Respondent. 
MICHELLE J. YASKEL, pro se 
WALTER J. PELLEGRINI, GENERAL COUNSEL (MAUREEN SEIDEL of 
counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by Michelle J. 
Yaskel to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) 
dismissing her charge that the State of New York (Department of 
Transportation)(State) violated §209-a.l(c) of the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it terminated her 
probationary appointment after she sought' assistance from her 
union at a meeting with her supervisors to discuss her negative 
probationary evaluation.-f 
-
7Yaskel was hired as a senior typist effective August 12, 1993. 
Her continued employment was subject to a 52-week probationary 
period, during which she received four evaluations. In the 
first, she was rated satisfactory. Her second evaluation rated 
her as needing improvement in several areas. It was this 
evaluation which led to a meeting at which Yaskel, her union 
representative, and her supervisor were present. Yaskel's third 
evaluation was satisfactory. The final probationary report rated 
her overall as unsatisfactory. Her termination from employment 
was effective August 10, 1994. 
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The ALT, crediting the testimony of Yaskel's supervisor, 
Arthur Marchesi, found that Yaskel had been engaged in protected 
activity when she included the union in her evaluation review 
meeting with Marchesi and that the State was aware of this 
protected activity. Based on Marchesi's testimony, however, the 
AKJ determined that Yaskel received her "unsatisfactory" 
evaluation because of her personality conflict with a co-worker 
who had some supervisory responsibilities over Yaskel, and 
Yaskel's inability, in part due to the friction with the co-
worker, to follow office procedures. 
Yaskel argues in her exceptions that a personality conflict 
alone is insufficient to terminate a probationary employee, that 
Marchesi's testimony should not have been credited and that case 
law does not support the ALT's decision. The State asserts that 
Yaskel's exceptions were untimely filed and are otherwise 
meritless. 
After a review of the record and the parties' arguments, we 
affirm the decision of the ALT. 
We address the State's claim of untimely exceptions first. 
Section 204.10 of PERB's Rules of Procedure (Rules) requires that 
exceptions to an ALT's decision be filed within fifteen working 
days after the party's receipt of the decision. Yaskel received 
the ALT's decision on November 6, 1995, and filed her exceptions 
on November 28, 1995. Section 200.9 of the Rules provides that 
working days do not include Saturdays, Sundays or legal holidays. 
Excluding Saturdays, Sundays, Election Day, and Thanksgiving Day, 
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Yaskel's exceptions had to be filed by November 29, 1995, to be 
timely.-7 The State argues that Election Day should not be 
counted as a legal holiday because State offices were open and 
mail was delivered by the U. S. Postal Service on that day. 
General Construction Law §24 includes "each general election day" 
as a legal holiday. It is the public identity of the day, not 
what transpires on the day, that makes any given day a "legal 
holiday" within the meaning of our Rules. Election Day, a legal 
holiday, was properly excluded from the "working days" 
calculation. In any event, even were we to count Election Day as 
a "working day" within the meaning of the Rules, November 28, 
1995, would be the last day for filing exceptions and Yaskel's 
y exceptions, postmarked on that date,^would still be timely. 
Yaskel's exceptions are, therefore, properly before us, whether 
Election Day is included or excluded from the filing period. 
Yaskel argues in her exceptions that, while she had a 
personality conflict with her co-worker, it was* the co-worker's 
fault and that Marchesi conspired with the co-worker against new 
employees. Although Yaskel was present and represented at the 
hearing before the ALJ, she also asserts in her exceptions that 
she can call additional witnesses to support her position that 
Marchesi's testimony should not have been credited by the ALJ. 
The ALJ credited Marchesi's testimony that he was not 
angered by Yaskel's inclusion of a union representative in their 
J 
-''Veterans Day fell on a Saturday in 1995. 
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meeting about her second, generally negative, probationary 
evaluation. Based upon agreements reached at the meeting, 
Marchesi changed Yaskel's evaluation to a satisfactory one. 
Although Yaskel's third evaluation was satisfactory, Marchesi 
testified, and the ALT found, that her performance in the final 
thirteen weeks of her employment degenerated. The AKT credited 
Marchesi's testimony that, in the weeks prior to the end of 
Yaskel's probationary period, she was not making an effort to 
work harmoniously with others in the office and that she was 
inappropriately questioning her work assignments and office 
procedures. Her final evaluation was, therefore, negative and 
she was terminated. 
There is nothing in the record which would warrant 
disturbing the ALJ's credibility resolution and factual findings. 
That Yaskel now asserts that there are other witnesses whom she 
could call to support her version of the facts does not warrant a 
reversal of the ALJ's findings, or even a remand to take such 
testimony.-7 The record evidences that she was afforded full 
opportunity to present all relevant evidence and testimony at the 
hearing. 
Yaskel's exceptions are denied and the ALT's determination 
that Yaskel was not terminated because of her exercise of her 
statutorily protected rights is, therefore, affirmed. 
-
7There is no allegation that this evidence is newly discovered. 
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IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: February 28, 1996 
Albany, New York 
jky^^ \ l^y\ 
Pauline R. Kinsella"/ Chairperson 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
ROBERT W. CASE, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NOS. U-12496 
U-12536 
U-12547 
U-12548 
MONROE COMMUNITY COLLEGE, U-12594 
U-13319 
Respondent. 
ROBERT W. CASE, pro se 
NIXON, HARGRAVE, DEVANS & DOYLE (EUGENE D. ULTERINO of 
counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
These cases come to us on exceptions filed by Robert W. Case 
to a decision by an Administrative Law Judge (ALT) on several 
charges he filed against his former employer, the Monroe 
Community College (College).-' Case's first charge (U-12496) 
alleges that the College did not renew his term appointment as 
director of athletics and head basketball coach because he had 
filed a grievance through the Association and that the College 
thereafter generally and specifically threatened, punished, 
investigated, criticized, and bribed him to cause him to withdraw 
the grievance and resign from employment. All of the remaining 
-
70ne other charge (U-12 624) was filed against the College by 
Case's bargaining agent, the Monroe Community College Faculty 
Association (Association). The ALT dismissed the Association's 
charge and it has not filed any exceptions to the ALT's decision. 
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charges allege that the College continued to harass and punish 
Case for maintaining the first grievance, for filing another, and 
for otherwise engaging in activities protected by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act). All of the charges allege 
a violation of §209-a.l(a) of the Act. 
After seventeen days of hearing on a record containing in 
excess of 2,000 pages and hundreds of exhibits, the ALT dismissed 
all of the charges. The ALT held that the College's decision not 
to renew Case's term appointment was made before it had any 
knowledge that Case had consulted with the Association about a 
late job evaluation and a student's complaint that Case had 
sexually and otherwise harassed her, and before any grievances 
had been filed. Moreover, the ALT found no credible evidence of 
union animus on the part of any of the several College officials 
who were involved in the many actions which Case alleges were 
retaliatory. In making these determinations, the ALJ relied, in 
part, upon findings made by Arbitrator Benewitz on a grievance 
filed regarding Case's nonrenewal. In material respect, 
Arbitrator Benewitz found that Case had been directed several 
times by his supervisor to avoid any contact with the student who 
had made the harassment complaint against Case and that Case had 
repeatedly disobeyed those instructions, to the point of twice 
stating to his supervisor that he "had to do what [he] had to 
do". Arbitrator Benewitz found that Case's refusal to comply 
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with his supervisor's directives regarding student contact was 
the reason he was not renewed. 
The ALT made separate dispositions of each of Case's 
allegations apart from his nonrenewal and found that none were in 
any way improper under the Act. In general summary of these 
several dispositions, the ALJ concluded that the College had 
simply responded in a permissible manner to circumstances created 
by Case, who had become, through the spring and summer of 1991, 
increasingly derelict in his job performance and attendance and 
unresponsive to inquiries made by his immediate supervisor and 
other College officials. Certain other actions claimed to have 
violated the Act were found by the ALJ not to have been 
undertaken by the College or its agents at all, e.g., an 
investigation prompted by a Monroe County legislator of the 
College's athletic department finances and an alleged offer to 
Case by an "associate" of the student who had allegedly been 
harassed to have the student's criminal harassment complaint 
dropped if Case would withdraw any grievances and improper 
practice charges. 
Case argues to us that the ALT's decision must be negated 
because the Benewitz arbitration award was modified in part on 
appeal and that the award was "at the heart of the Administrative 
Law Judge's decision". Case offers to "withdraw the entire PERB 
matter" if we render the ALT's decision a "nondecision". Case 
otherwise argues that the ALT erred as a matter of fact and law 
Board - U-12496, U-12536, U-12547, -4 
U-12548, U-12594 & U-13319 
in finding that the College did not violate the Act, in not 
issuing subpoenas for the appearance of certain persons, in not 
permitting certain testimony, and in not reopening the hearing in 
response to a different arbitration award. 
The College argues that the Benewitz arbitration award was 
properly considered and that the A U committed no material errors 
of fact or law in rendering her decision or in making any of the 
rulings in issue during the lengthy processing of these charges. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties7 
arguments, we affirm the ALJ's decision. 
The findings of fact and conclusions of the Benewitz 
arbitration award regarding Case's nonrenewal are not 
challengeable in this proceeding.-7 It was conclusively held in 
that award that Case disobeyed the instructions of his supervisor 
regarding student contact and that this was the cause for the 
nonrenewal of his term appointment. The Appellate Division's 
decision modifies the arbitration award only to delete that part 
of the award actually entered which states that Case had been 
"terminated for insubordination". The award was modified only 
because the issue presented by the parties to the arbitrator, in 
relevant part,, was whether the College violated the parties-' 
contract in conjunction with the "nonrenewal" of a term 
appointment. Although modifying the award entered so that it 
conformed to the issue actually presented, i.e., "nonrenewal", 
g/Ranni v. Ross, 58 N.Y.2d 715 (1982). 
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rather than "termination", the Appellate Division's decision did 
not disturb any of the findings of fact made by the arbitrator. 
Therefore, the AKJ committed no error in relying upon the 
findings made in that award. 
Moreover, wholly apart from the Benewitz award, the ALT 
found, and we agree, that the record establishes that none of the 
College's actions were improperly motivated or otherwise 
violative of the Act. The decision not to renew Case's term 
appointment was made before the responsible College officials 
knew Case had contacted the Association either formally or 
informally. Case's allegation that the College had to have known 
about his consultation with the Association because information 
was "leaked" to them has no credible support in the record. 
The record also does not establish any reasonable basis to 
conclude that the College was improperly motivated in making any 
of its decisions regarding Case's employment. To the contrary, 
the record reflects an administration willing to give Case every 
consideration, even to the point of renewing his appointment, 
despite the harassment allegations, until Case's own actions left 
them with no reasonable option other than to let his term 
appointment expire. Case's exercise of statutorily protected 
rights was minor and of a type the College's administration would 
encounter on a regular basis. The record is simply not 
reasonably susceptible to a conclusion that the College undertook 
a wide-ranging conspiracy involving multiple actors and actions 
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within and without the College's administration to retaliate 
against Case because he talked to the Association and filed a 
grievance or two which he would not withdraw. 
Case alleges and argues that what happened after he was told 
his appointment would not be renewed was in furtherance of an 
unlawful plan of retaliation commenced with that nonrenewal. 
Once it is concluded, as we do, that the nonrenewal was not in 
violation of the Act, the rest of Case's allegations of 
impropriety, all tied directly to that first act, similarly fail. 
The AU's findings that Case's several allegations of impropriety 
apart from the nonrenewal have no merit as a matter of fact and 
law are fully supported by the record. The ALJ's decision 
discusses each allegation and the rationale set forth in her 
decision need not be repeated here. 
The arbitration award which Case argues necessitates a 
reopening of the record is immaterial to the disposition of this 
charge. That arbitrator's award does not, as Case argues, even 
question, much less attack, the credibility of any College 
official. The arbitrator holds only that the College had 
inadvertently denied Case access to certain documents which 
formed the basis for a decision to discipline Case. Nothing in 
that award affects the credibility resolutions actually made by 
the ALJ or otherwise warrants a reopening of the record. 
We have considered Case's other bases for reopening this 
extensive record and find them all similarly without merit. The 
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rulings made during the hearings were either within the scope of 
the ALJ's discretion, were correct, or were nonprejudicial. In 
these regards, Case was afforded a fair and reasonable 
opportunity to present evidence in support of his allegations. 
The overwhelming weight of the record evidence leads us, as it 
has other disinterested reviewers previously, to the inescapable 
conclusion that every employment consequence about which Case 
complains in these charges stemmed from his unwillingness to do 
his job as the College expected and to follow the reasonable 
directives issued to him by his supervisors. Case's guilt or 
innocence on the charges leveled against him by the College or 
others is immaterial and we express no opinion in that regard. 
In affirming the ALJ's decision, we find only that none of the 
College's actions involve per se violations of the Act and that 
none of the decisions made or actions taken by the College 
stemmed from motives unlawful under the Act. 
For the reasons set forth above, Case's exceptions are 
denied and the ALJ's decision is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charges must be, and 
hereby are, dismissed. 
DATJSD: February 28, 1996 
Albany, New York 
I. Kinsella, Chairperson 
Schmertz, Member/ 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TRIBOROUGH BRIDGE AND TUNNEL AUTHORITY, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-16482 
BRIDGE AND TUNNEL OFFICERS BENEVOLENT 
ASSOCIATION, 
Respondent. 
PROSKAUER, ROSE, GOETZ & MENDELSOHN (NEIL H. ABRAMSON of 
counsel), for Charging Party 
HAYT, HAYT & LANDAU (LAWRENCE J. WEINGARD of counsel), for 
Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
On February 17, 1995, the Triborough Bridge and Tunnel 
Authority (Authority) filed an improper practice charge alleging 
that the Bridge and Tunnel Officers Benevolent Association 
(Association) had violated §209-a.2(b) of the Public Employees7 
Fair Employment Act (Act) by submitting two nonmandatory demands 
to arbitration. The charge was thereafter heard and decided by 
an Administrative Law Judge (ALT). The Authority excepts to that 
part of the decision of the ALT which rejected the Authority's 
argument that the demands were barred from arbitration because 
they were modifications of original proposals and his decision 
that one of the modified demands is a mandatory subject of 
negotiation. The Association excepts to the ALJ's determination 
that one of its demands is nonmandatory. 
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This is the second time these parties have been before us to 
seek a determination on the negotiability of demands submitted to 
arbitration after expiration in 1991 of their last agreement. In 
our earlier decision,i7 we found, as here relevant, that the 
following two Association demands were nonmandatory because, by 
the Association's own admission, the demands were intended to 
cover retirees. Those demands were as follows: 
Demand 62A 
The [Authority] shall increase the present major 
medical coverage to $1,000,000 per person, per illness, 
per year. 
Demand 64 
Article VII, 1 shall be modified to read: 
The Authority shall contribute to the Bridge and Tunnel 
Officers Family Protection Plan a sum annually for each 
employee as follows: 
January 1, 1991 - $1,500.00 
January 1, 1992 - $2,000.00 
Thereafter, on February 14, 1995, the Association filed an 
amended response to the Authority's interest arbitration 
petition, referencing the proceedings up to that point and 
further stating that it 
has been directed to withdraw from arbitration certain 
demands. Accordingly, and in compliance with the 
Board's directive, we hereby withdraw demands ... 62A 
[and] 64 ... as those demands appear in Exhibit "a" 
annexed hereto. However, and in accordance with the 
reasoning and rationale set forth in the Board's 
December 22, 1994 [decision], the Association would 
modify demands 62A and 64 downward so as to read as 
-^Bridge and Tunnel Officers Benevolent Ass'n, 27 PERB 5[3076 
(1994) . 
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follows and request that they be forwarded to the 
Arbitration panel. 
1) Modified Union Demand 62A: 
The Authority shall increase the major medical coverage 
for current employees and current employees who may 
retire during the life of the Contract, to $1,000,000 
per person, per illness, per year. 
2) Modified Union Demand 64: 
Article VII, 1 shall be modified to read: 
The Authority shall contribute to the Bridge and Tunnel 
Officers Family Protection Plan a sum annually for each 
current employee and current employees who may retire 
during the life of the contract as follows: 
January 1, 1991 - $1,500.00 
January 1, 1992 - $2,000.00 
By letter dated March 28, 1995, the Association sought to 
further modify demand 64 by modifying Article VII, §2 as follows: 
The Authority shall continue to make Welfare Fund 
contributions for employees retiring on or after 
January 1, 1977 and who retired prior to December 31, 
1990 in accordance with the annual sums for each 
employee which became effective on January 1, 1990.-7 
The first of ten hearing days of interest arbitration was 
held on March 6, 1995, and the last on April 20, 1995. The 
arbitration panel issued its award on June 20, 1995, but its 
decision did not cover demands 62A or 64. The panel agreed to 
retain jurisdiction over those Association demands pending PERB's 
determination on their negotiability. 
-
7The clause in the parties' expired agreement states: "The 
Authority shall make Welfare Fund contributions to employees 
retiring on or after January 1, 1977; the payment for such 
retirees shall be in the same amount as for active employees." 
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The ALJ found that during negotiations, prior to mediation 
and arbitration, the parties had discussed demands 62A and 64 as 
they related to both current employees and retirees. The levels 
of contribution per employee discussed are the same in the 
modified demands as in the original demands, with the overall 
cost to the Authority being reduced because the modified demands 
exclude retirees who were included in the original demands. 
The ALJ determined that the modified demands were not time-
barred, as asserted by the Authority, because they were not "new" 
demands and the subject matter of the demands had previously been 
negotiated by the parties. He further found demand 62A to be 
mandatory as it related to major medical coverage for current 
employees or employees who retired during the life of the 
contract being negotiated. Demand 64 was found by the ALJ to be 
nonmandatory because, even though the demand, as modified, 
applied only to current employees, the contributions sought from 
the Authority by the Association were to be paid to a fund that 
made payments to both current employees and retirees. 
For the reasons set forth below, we affirm, in part, and 
reverse, in part, the ALJ's decision. 
The ALJ correctly determined that demands found by this 
Board to be nonmandatory subjects of negotiation may be amended, 
clarified, or otherwise modified and resubmitted if the demand as 
revised is not a new demand. Although the Authority argues that 
no amendments or modifications to demands should be allowed after 
we have issued a "scope" decision, to preclude the parties from 
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amending demands would unduly and unnecessarily restrict the 
bargaining process.-7 
The Association's modified demands did make substantive 
changes in its original demands, but the demands as modified 
cannot be considered new within the meaning of our decisions. 
The subject matter of both demands was discussed during the 
parties7 negotiations and the modification results in a narrowing 
of the class of persons to whom the demands would apply. Such a 
narrowing is a permissible modification in the demand. As we 
noted in City of Schenectady-7; 
While the demands offered by the PBA contain 
substantive revisions, they cannot be construed 
as raising new or different subjects of bargaining, as 
would be the case if a party sought to withdraw a 
demand concerning one subject and substitute for it a 
demand on an entirely different subject which had not 
been previously negotiated. Indeed, the City does not 
appear to suggest that the parties did not engage in 
negotiations concerning the [subject matter of the 
demands].... 
A party may correct observed deficiencies in a demand and seek 
negotiations on the amended demand, including submission of the 
amended demand to an interest arbitration panel during the period 
of time that the interest arbitration proceeding is pending. 
-
7We have allowed the amendment of demands made in a brief 
submitted to the Board, Amherst Police Club, Inc., 12 PERB 13 071 
(1979); at a pre-hearing conference, Niskavuna Police Benevolent 
Ass'n, Inc. , 14 PERB f3067 (1981); and after a determination 
that the original demand was nonmandatory, City "'of Schenectady, 
22 PERB 53018 (1989). 
4722 PERB 53018, at 3048 (1989). 
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Having determined that the Association's demands were not 
barred from arbitration simply because they were modifications of 
the original demands, we turn to the substance of the proposals. 
Both modified demands 62A and 64 cover current employees and 
current employees who may retire during the life of the contract. 
In Cohoes Police Benevolent and Protective Associationf-7 we 
made clear that the mandatory nature of a demand depends upon it 
being related to terms and conditions of employment of current 
employees. That the compensation or benefit may be paid after 
the employee leaves the service of the employer is not 
dispositive of the negotiability issue. 
Both of the demands before us refer to current employees and 
to current employees who retire during ,the life of the agreement, 
which would not, on the face of the demands, render them 
nonmandatory. However, the agreement being negotiated by these 
parties is for the years 1991 and 1992. At the time the 
Association's original demands were made, the parties' previous 
agreement had not yet expired, but the demand referred to all 
employees, including employees then retired, rendering the demand 
nonmandatory. The modification, which removed the nonmandatory 
language, was not made by the Association until 1995, years after 
the expiration of the parties' last agreement. As such, the 
reference in the modified demand to "current employees who may 
r 
retire during the life of the contract" may now be reasonably 
^27 PERB f3 058 (1994). 
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read to refer to employees who were employed during 1991 and 1992 
but who may have retired at the time that the modified demand was 
made. If we were to construe our reference in Cohoes to 
"current" employees to mean only those employees who were 
employed by an employer at the time the demand under 
consideration is first made, then the Association's modified 
demands in this case would be nonmandatory because the admitted 
intent of its demands is to include all persons employed by the 
Authority during 1991 or 1992, even if they may have retired from 
employment by 1995, when the modified demand was made. The 
reference in Cohoes to "current" employees, however, was not 
intended to be measured only by when a bargaining demand is first 
made. "Current" employees, for purposes of assessing the 
negotiability of a demand in negotiations, and unless otherwise 
defined by the parties, must mean all employees who were employed 
during the term of the contract being negotiated, even if the 
negotiations continue, as they so often do, beyond the term of 
the prior contract and the demand in issue is not first presented 
until well into the negotiations. Just as a demand may be 
retroactive, so too may its application to the class of employees 
covered by the demand. We, therefore, determine that the 
reference to "current employees who may retire during the life of 
the contract" does not render either of the Association's 
modified demands nonmandatory because the demands capture only 
those persons who were actually employed during the period in 
which the demand will apply, i.e. 1991-92. By specifically 
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excluding from its demands those persons who retired before 
January 1, 1991, the Association limited its demand to current 
employees for purposes of this scope of negotiations dispute. 
The ALJ found that demand 64 was nonmandatory because it 
sought contributions from the Authority to a fund which made 
payments to both current employees and retirees. He relied upon 
our decision in New York City Transit Authority.-7 The ALJ 
misconstrued New York City Transit Authority when he interpreted 
it to mean that a demand for payments on behalf of current 
employees to a fund or program which may also make payments to, 
or provide benefits for, individuals who are not members of the 
bargaining unit is nonmandatory. The reason that the demand in 
that case was nonmandatory was because it called for the employer 
to make payments for both unit employees and retirees. The 
demand was for the benefit of individuals who were not members of 
the bargaining unit and who were not, therefore, properly persons 
on whose behalf bargaining demands could be made. To read New 
York City Transit Authority as did the ALJ would render 
nonmandatory those demands, for example, calling for payments on 
behalf of current unit employees to health insurance carriers or 
plans which also cover any non-unit persons. We have 
consistently found such demands to be mandatory. New York City 
Transit Authority does not and was not intended to hold to the 
contrary and we reverse the ALJ's holding in this regard. 
^22 PERB 16501 (1989). 
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We do find, however, that the modification of Article VII, 
§2 in demand 64, as contained in the Association's March 28 
letter, is nonmandatory because it refers solely to retired 
employees. Because it is severable from Article VII, §1 in 
modified demand 64, our finding regarding Article VII, §2 does 
not affect the negotiability of Article VII, §1 which applies to 
bargaining unit members employed during the term of the demand. 
Based on the foregoing, we dismiss the Authority's 
exceptions. We find that the Association's submission of Article 
VII, §2 to arbitration violated §209-a.2(b) of the Act. The 
Association is hereby ordered to withdraw from arbitration its 
March 28, 1995 demand regarding Article VII, §2. We affirm the 
ALJ's decision finding that the Association's modified demand 62A 
is mandatorily negotiable and we grant the Association's 
exceptions and reverse the ALJ's finding as to Article VII, §1 in 
modified demand 64, which we find to be mandatorily negotiable. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the Authority's charge must 
be, and it hereby is, dismissed as it relates to demands 62A and 
64 Article VII, §1. 
DATED: February 28, 1996 
Albany, New York 
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STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
INTERNATIONAL UNION OP OPERATING 
ENGINEERS, LOCAL 463, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4466 
TOWN OF LEWISTON, 
Employer, 
-and-
TEAMSTERS, LOCAL 264, 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that Teamsters, Local 2 64 has been 
designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the 
parties and described below, as their exclusive representative 
for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Certification - C-4466 - 2 -
Unit: Included: All Highway and Drainage Department employees. 
Excluded: All supervisory and clerical employees in the 
Highway and Drainage Departments and all other 
employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with Teamsters, Local 264. The duty 
to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet 
at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to 
wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or 
the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising 
thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement 
incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party. 
Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: February 28, 1996 
Albany, New York 
Pauline R. Kmsella, Chairperson 
Eric rf.Schmertz,Member 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION 
LOCAL 424, A DIVISION OF UNITED INDUSTRY 
WORKERS COUNCIL 424, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4469 
NORTHPORT-EAST NORTHPORT UNION FREE 
SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer, 
-and-
LOCAL 144, LONG ISLAND DIVISION 
SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL 
UNION, AFL-CIO, 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the United Public Service 
Employees Union Local 424, A Division of United Industry Workers 
District Council 424 has been designated and selected by a 
majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in 
the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
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negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All full and part time employees in the 
following categories: Head Custodian, 
Assistant Head Custodian, Leadmen Custodian 
(Elementary), Lead Groundskeeper, Lead 
Maintenance Mechanic, Custodian, Groundskeeper, 
Custodian-Bus Driver, Maintenance Mechanic, 
Maintenance Helper, Painter, Courier, and 
Custodial Storekeeper. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the United Public Service 
Employees Union Local 424, A Division of United Industry Workers 
District Council 424. The duty to negotiate collectively 
includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other 
terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an 
agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution 
of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a 
concession. 
DATED: February 28, 1996 
Albany, New York 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION 
LOCAL 424, A DIVISION OF UNITED INDUSTRY 
WORKERS DISTRICT COUNCIL 424, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4472 
COLD SPRING HARBOR CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer, 
-and-
HARBOR OFFICE PERSONNEL ASSOCIATION, 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the United Public Service 
Employees Union Local 424, A Division of United Industry Workers 
District Council 424 has been designated and selected by a 
majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in 
the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
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exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All clerical employees. 
Excluded: All other employees, and those clerical 
employees designated as confidential. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the United Public Service 
Employees Union Local 424, A Division of United Industry Workers 
District Council 424. The duty to negotiate collectively 
includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other 
terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an 
agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution 
of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a 
concession. 
DATED: February 28, 1996 
Albany, New York 
i A-yv Paul ine R. Kfinsella,1 Chai rperson 
Er i c C/. Schmertz, Member 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 10 00, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4475 
VILLAGE OF EAST ROCHESTER, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
, IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO has been 
designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the 
parties and described below, as their exclusive representative 
for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Unit: Included: Laborer, truck driver, mechanic, mechanic's 
helper and mason. 
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Excluded: All other employees. 
' FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO. The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at 
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, 
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the 
negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any 
agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation 
does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require 
the making of a concession. 
DATED: February 28, 1996 
Albany, New York 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
HARPURSVILLE TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, NYSUT, 
AFT, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4490 
HARPURSVILLE CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Harpursville Teachers 
Association, NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO has been designated and selected 
by a majority of the employees of the above-named public 
employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described 
below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of 
collective negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: Teachers, counselors, teaching assistants, 
psychologists, health professionals and those 
individuals who have served 2 0 or more 
consecutive days per school year, as 
substitutes. 
Excluded: Superintendent and Building Principals. 
Certification - C-4490 
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FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Harpursville Teachers 
Association, NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO. The duty to negotiate 
collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable 
times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and 
other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of 
an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the 
execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement 
reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not 
compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making 
of a concession. 
DATED: February 28, 1996 
Albany, New York 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
Erifc J. Schmertz, Member 
